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Abstract 
Throughout human history, technology has proven its ability to contribute to higher 
material living standards, yet the work of poverty alleviation is far from complete. We 
believe that in the modern age, biotechnology holds remarkable potential for reducing 
poverty and its attendant adversities. However, the extent to which this promise is 
fulfilled will depend as much on institutions as it does on innovation. In these early 
stages of development, biotechnology is concentrated in the most developed, Tier I 
countries. In this paper, we envision future biotechnology diffusion around the world, 
with large emergent Tier II economies playing a catalytic role in propagating affordable 
and appropriate innovation products. Through the mechanism of a globally R&D supply 
chain, such products can ultimately reach the world’s poorest and improve their dietary, 
health, and income status. For this to happen, three general conditions must be satisfied. 
First, property rights must be clearly delineated and recognized by more universal 
standards. Second, multilateral public and private initiative must be taken to lower 
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barriers to diffusion. These include government intervention, imperfect contractual 
standards, and incomplete information. A broad spectrum of government policies—
from outright protectionism to corruption—impedes the propagation of innovation 
between countries of all three Tiers. Incompatibility and incompleteness of legal 
systems are also major obstacles to international sharing of innovation. Finally, 
informational commons supported by institutions like the IPR clearinghouse are needed 
to facilitate innovation partnership.  
We present a general vision of R&D networks extending from the capital and 
technology rich Tier I, through the dynamic Tier II emerging economies, to those, 
finally, in Tier III who most need enhanced agricultural and human productivity. We 
believe that achieving this goal is not only desirable, but imperative to global 
sustainable development. If the poor are to enjoy the full benefits of agricultural 
biotechnology, its productivity gains must be conferred on both rural and urban low 
income households. The former will benefit directly if biotechnology is appropriate 
(both in terms of technology and incentives) for penetration into smallholder production 
systems. By contrast, the latter benefit must be indirect, with lower food prices 
contributing favourably to real wages of the urban poor. Only dramatic increases in 
productivity can thus reconcile producer and consumer interests domestically, but 




1  Introduction and background 
Economic history can be read as a testament to the transformative power of technology 
in relation to the human condition. The older part of this testament tells of a progression 
from hunting to farming to military technologies, while the newer part begins when 
mechanization and fossil fuels were first enlisted for industrial production. Across the 
entire chronicle, we see what a potent catalyst technology has been for economic growth 
and the alleviation of poverty. Using energy-intensive mechanical technologies, we 
have achieved living standards for hundreds of millions of people around the globe that 
are beyond the imaginings of prior generations. Despite our many successes, however, 
technology is still far from fulfilling its promise to all of us. The so-called industrial 
revolution is already over two centuries old, and today human voices can whisper 
between any two points on the globe in a heartbeat, yet such benefits have reached less 
than half of mankind.  
The World Bank estimates that in 1998, 56 per cent of humanity lived on less than 
US$2 per day, while 24 per cent subsisted on less than half this amount. How can 
scientific discovery and technology make more significant contributions to the world’s 
poor majority? We believe that more effective globalization of innovation processes can 
be put to work on the fundamental determinants of poverty, those factors that make 
people poor and keep them poor. Detailed analysis of poverty reveals that entry into this 
status and exit from it are asymmetric, yet they share some characteristics. In particular, 
the primary reason for a household falling into poverty is an adverse health event, 
including mortality.1 On the up side, the main determinant of transit from poverty to 
non-poverty is (formal and informal) employment. In both cases, health status is critical, 
directly with respect to downside poverty risk and indirectly in terms of fitness for 
recruitment and labour productivity. In the case of employment, economic growth and 
rising productivity, especially in the rural sector, are essential to increase the probability 
of exiting poverty. 
We believe that technology in general, and biotechnology in particular, can greatly 
improve living standards in the developing world. As the touchstone for a new 
generation of rural development, biotechnology can increase food output, nutritional 
quality, and rural employment more quickly than populations will grow, alleviating 
direct nutritional deficiency and increasing incomes for the world’s poor rural majority. 
Because it is also at the heart of a medical revolution, biotechnology has the potential to 
dramatically improve health status in developing countries, liberating the poor for more 
sustained and productive labour force participation. 
Although it remains an area of controversy, biotechnology has already achieved 
productivity gains that appear to rival those of the green revolution (Evenson and Gollin 
2001). Less controversially it has certainly begun to alter the landscape of preventative 
and therapeutic medicine. If the impetus for scientific discovery in life sciences can be 
further intensified, and if this innovation can be more effectively diversified from north 
to south, we believe that dramatic progress can be made in realizing the human and 
economic potential of all peoples. In this paper, we survey the challenges 
and opportunities that exist for two kinds of life science technologies, agricultural and 
                                                 
1  For more detail on these issues, see e.g., Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2000); Ravallion (1988).  
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medical biotechnologies. Together, these represent some of today’s most dynamic areas 
of innovation, some of the greatest challenges to global technology diffusion, and some 
of the greatest opportunities for improving living standards. The extent to which 
agricultural biotechnology can help the world’s poor will depend on two components: 
how these productivity gains penetrate smallholder agriculture, and how much lower 
food prices can increase real wages for the poor. Depending on patterns of diffusion and 
adoption, either or both of these benefits may occur, but the potential for each is very 
substantial, and policymakers should work to facilitate them. The extent to which 
medical biotechnology can help the world’s poor will depend primarily upon the extent 
to which it is applied to medical conditions affecting poverty, which in turn will depend 
both upon access to therapeutics and diagnosics developed in industrial countries for 
common diseases and upon development of therapeutics and diagnostics for diseases 
specific to poverty. 
2  Technology in a modern global context 
History indicates that technological advancement and sustained increases in general 
living standards go hand in hand. Just as importantly, today’s global income inequality 
is characterized by disparities in the scope and depth of technological assimilation. If 
the benefits of technology are to advance more widely and rapidly across the 
socioeconomic spectrum, whether through agriculture, medicine, or other sectors, we 
must better understand the barriers technology has encountered in the past. Generally 
speaking, north-south diffusion of technology and sustainable innovation has been 
hindered by three salient factors: 
i)  Institutional capacity: Countries who receive innovation often lack the 
institutional pre-requisites to facilitate orderly and sustained assimilation of 
new technologies. Among other things, this applies to 
a)  Legal standards and enforceable property rights. 
b)  Administrative and regulatory capacity. 
c)  Public and private research capacity, including educational institutions. 
ii)  Financial capacity: Recipient countries often lack the financial resources 
necessary to capitalize the application of existing technologies or to invest in 
R&D for local innovation. In the absence of enforceable property rights, it is 
also difficult to recruit foreign capital that can alleviate this constraint. 
iii) Human capital: Clearly, there are very significant global disparities in 
average education levels, and these seriously limit the geographic scope of 
technology use and development. 
 
With these issues in mind, the challenge of globalizing technology becomes more 
transparent. In particular, we suggest a threefold classification of national economies, 
depending on the capacity to internalize and sustain technological progress.  
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Tier  I  Established innovators, essentially the OECD countries that have already 
become technology-intensive economies. 
Tier II  Emergent innovators, including China and India, which are in transition and 
overcoming all three types of obstacles discussed above.  
Tier  III Long-term importers of technology. These are the majority of today’s 
economies, and a much larger majority of developing economies. 
Membership in each of these groups is defined from today’s perspective, and countries 
can be expected to transition between them over time. While all countries aspire to join 
the first group, it is, however, unlikely that many will move from third to first place in 
the short to medium term. For this reason, global technology diffusion will evolve 
unevenly, as will its attendant benefits, and institutional arrangements need to evolve 
accordingly. This is more than casual observation, however, because the mechanics of 
north-south technology diffusion will operate very differently, depending upon whether 
the recipient is a Tier II or Tier III economy. These mechanics will in turn affect optimal 
policies to facilitate the benefits of diffusion.  
In the next two sections, we survey the main issues relating poverty and the two leading 
applications of biotechnology, in agriculture and medicine. In both of these areas, the 
challenges facing the world’s poor are enormous, and we believe the potential for 
beneficial innovations arising from biotechnology to be of commensurate magnitude. 
Having passed through two great eras of modern technology, industrialization and the 
digital revolution, we see mankind moving toward a third era, one where life sciences 
will unlock tremendous potential in natural resources, agriculture, and health for 
improving living standards. 
2 Challenges  and  opportunities  for agricultural biotechnology 
The demands on agriculture over the next generation, in developing countries and 
elsewhere, will be enormous. This is particularly so if agriculture is to meet all three of 
its primary global challenges: 
i)  To satisfy ever growing effective demand for food; 
ii)  Reduce poverty and malnutrition; 
iii)  Achieve environmental sustainability. 
Because of population growth and rising incomes, demand in the developing countries 
is predicted to increase by 59 per cent for cereals, 60 per cent for roots and tubers, and 
120 per cent for meat over this period (Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch 1999). 
This increased supply cannot come from area expansion since this is a rapidly 
diminishing source of output growth globally and has already turned negative in Asia 
and Latin America. Neither can it come from any significant expansion in irrigated area 
due to competition for water with urban demand and rising environmental problems 
associated with drainage, soil salinity, and chemical run-offs. While it will thus need to 
come from growth in yields, the growth rate in cereal yields in developing countries has 
been declining from an annual rate of 2.9 per cent in 1967-82 to 1.8 per cent in 1982-94,  
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which is the rate needed to satisfy the predicted 59 per cent increase in demand for 
cereals over the next 25 years. The growth in yields cannot consequently be let to fall 
below this rate in developing countries without further increasing the share of food 
consumption that is imported. Of course greater international food trade might increase 
global welfare because of efficiency gains, and higher-income Asian economies have 
successfully bartered industrial comparative advantage against steeply rising food 
imports. For poor countries, however, long-term food import dependence can be risky 
when commodity price cycles are taken into account.  
Secondly, the livelihood of the world’s poor majority still depends critically on local 
agricultural profitability. With 1.2 billion people in absolute poverty (earning less than 
US$1 per day, see World Bank 2000) and 792 million underfed in the developing 
countries (FAO 2004), agriculture should also have a major role to play in reducing 
poverty and improving food security (i.e., the probability of not falling into hunger), 
particularly since some three quarters of these poor and underfed live in rural areas 
where they derive part, if not all, of their livelihoods from agriculture as producers or as 
workers in agriculture and its related industries. Urban migration has provided an 
alternative in the most dynamic export economies, yet real income of poor consumers 
will continue to depend on the price of food. The only way to reconcile these interests 
domestically is productivity growth in agriculture, reducing costs to make room for 
rural income without reducing urban real wages by increasing food prices. 
The potential does exist to confer, via the mechanism of north-south technology 
transfer, significantly higher food productivity and rural incomes on developing 
countries. There are many channels by which these effects may be propagated, and yet 
not all will accomplish net reductions in poverty and inequality.2 Our overall 
assessment, however, is that there is substantial latitude for policymakers to choose 
policies that will facilitate these objectives as globalization and agricultural innovation 
continue their steady progress. Pragmatic and detailed institutional evaluation can 
support more proactive responses by the least advantaged stakeholders in global 
agricultural markets, the marginalized rural poor. 
If poverty is to fall and the nutritional status of the poor is to improve at current levels 
of food dependency, the decline in growth rate of cereal yields must be arrested, and 
yield increases compared to current trends will have to occur, particularly in the fields 
of poor farmers around the world. Since the yield growth rates achieved with traditional 
plant breeding and agronomic practices have been steadily declining, the next round of 
yield increases in agriculture will have to rely on the scientific advances offered by 
biotechnology, precision farming, and production ecology, with most of the gains 
expected to be derived from the first of these. Yet, while biotechnology has advanced 
agricultural productivity growth in some of the more developed countries, it has had 
little actual impact so far in most developing countries, particularly in the farming 
systems of the rural poor.  
Here we want to explore the necessary conditions for the current biotechnological 
revolution in agriculture could contribute to poverty reduction in developing countries. 
While there are certainly legitimate ethical and precautionary concerns regarding the use 
of some biotechnologies in some contexts, it should be kept in mind that there are also 
                                                 
2  See, e.g., Alston, Pardey and Taylor (2001) for an overview of these global trends.  
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ethical implications to withholding or obstructing the dissemination of a viable 
technology to those for whom it could make a material difference in welfare. Failure to 
develop and capture the potential of agricultural biotechnologies could further increase 
the income gap between developed and developing nations and could be a setback in the 
struggle to reduce poverty. At the same time, environmental and consumer risks that 
may, for example, derive from adoption of genetically modified organisms, will have to 
be carefully assessed and regulated for biotechnology to yield its potential benefits 
without undue risk of setbacks in the already constrained circumstances of the rural poor 
in developing countries. 
3 Challenges  and  opportunities for medical biotechnology 
Labour is the greatest asset in the hands of the world’s poor. Judging from the historical 
experiences of north and south, it is this labour asset that holds greatest economic 
potential for the alleviation of poverty. Thanks to legal progress, most of the world’s 
poor have economic entitlement to this asset, yet its productivity and thus its 
commensurate returns remain low. While there are many reasons for lower labour 
productivity in developing countries, one of the most significant and most challenging is 
health status. Initiatives to improve labour returns, directly through economic growth 
policies and indirectly through education and other human capital investments, can be 
seriously compromised by public and private health problems. Poor average health 
status reduces the private and social returns of all investments in job growth and 
education, reducing individual productivity and increasing effective dependency rates.3 
Health status is also an important factor in the dynamics of poverty and inequality. 
Econometric evidence indicates that adverse health events, including individual illness, 
disability, and family bereavement, are the most important determinants of transit from 
non-poverty into poverty.4 This being the case, health protection should be one of the 
highest priorities for social insurance. Unfortunately, social insurance schemes are not 
prevalent in developing countries, so more direct means are needed to target health 
status.  
While it is not a panacea, medical biotechnology can play an important role in 
improving health status and thus the quality of human capital in developing countries. 
Moreover, north-south chains of technology diffusion can facilitate this in ways 
analogous to their role in disseminating agricultural biotechnology.  
To better understand both the potential and limitations of biomedical contributions to 
developing country health status, consider a more comprehensive perspective on health 
risk (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1988) where risk is defined as the probability that a 
member of a population suffers from a negative health event or mortality within a given 
period of time. Following the literature on risk assessment, health risk can be 
decomposed into three components: 
                                                 
3  The dependency rate is defined as the population below and above working age, divided by total 
population. 
4  These results highlight obvious costs such as disability, but also less obvious ones in traditional 
societies, such as the substantial burden of death ceremonies.  
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i)  External environment 
a) Food  availability 
b) Contaminants 
c) Security  danger 
d) Climate 
ii)  Individual exposure 
a)  Protective or preventative behaviour 
b)   Access to food (income) 
c)   Protective resources 
iii)  Health 
a)  Genetic or nutritional status 
b) Health  care  system 
c) Medicines. 
For simplicity, since we will not be using an analytical model of risk, we will not 
distinguish between factors that are deterministic and those that are random, or between 
those that are given and those that can be controlled by policy. 
The first factor represents the totality of an individual’s ambient environment. These 
include prevalence of disease or pathogens in the surrounding population and 
environment, the state of infrastructure that may increase likelihood of accidents, 
environmental pollution, and other contamination levels.5 Some of these factors can of 
course be affected or reduced by policy interventions, such as improved water, 
sanitation, or spraying for mosquitoes.  
The second factor represents individual or group exposure to a given level of external 
factors. This includes behavioural variables affecting personal health, like use of 
filtration or of bottled water, protective bed nets and clothing, condoms, or avoidance of 
contaminated areas. 
The third and final factor represents individual or collective health vulnerability. This 
factor can be divided into individual health parameters, such as genetics and nutrition, 
especially pre-natal and post-natal nutrition, and more communal parameters including 
the quality of the local health care system and available medicines. 
This simple decomposition makes clear the scope and depth of the challenge to improve 
health status for the world’s poor. The external environment component arises from 
both natural and anthropogenic factors, usually outside the control of individuals and 
even local authorities. It is often the result of long histories of complex incentive and 
externality problems that, even when they are resolved, can present enormous 
remediation costs. In the developing world, divergence between private and public 
interests can be large and persistent, imposing chronically high risks to both the 
environment and health status. 
                                                 
5  Juma (1999) elaborates usefully on some of these issues.  
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Biotechnology’s contributions to environmental quality are well known and described 
elsewhere. These include things like bacterial waste treatment, phytoremediation 
technology, and renewable energy research. Despite these contributions, however, 
agbiotech and biomedicine cannot mitigate this component of health risk very 
significantly. Reducing ambient environmental contamination is an institutional 
exercise, usually involving substantial commitments to regulation and investments in 
public health related infrastructure.  
The factor of individual exposure is often outside the control, ironically, of individuals, 
and indeed may be positively correlated with status quo living standards in developing 
countries. As already mentioned, agricultural biotechnology can mitigate exposure risk 
if it reduces agrochemical use, but, otherwise, exposure risks are endemic to the 
population in most low-income countries. Biotechnology has more limited relevance 
here, again, but may provide a number of indirect interventions by contributing to 
increased knowledge of biological systems and suggesting new strategies for limiting 
exposure to existing risk factors.  
The health vulnerability component of overall risk is the one that biotechnology can 
most effectively influence because it incorporates the full universe of direct and indirect 
nutritional and medical interventions. In particular, the health component can be 
mitigated through biotechnology applications in agriculture that provide greater 
availability and nutritional content at lower prices and that reduce risk of shortages due 
to pest or drought conditions. Biomedical applications may provide effective 
instruments of disease prevention and treatment. For example, a great need for 
biomedical contribution in reducing health vulnerability is of course immunization 
technology. By contributing to the global commons of immunity, biotechnology can 
reduce the effective risk of ambient human and animal disease.6  
In addition to immunization, biotechnology is developing a broad spectrum of therapies 
through the pharmaceutical R&D pipeline. Yet, its benefits have primarily been enjoyed 
by consumers in wealthier societies who finance R&D activities with large public and 
corporate budgets. This is not an option for the world’s poor, so if biomedicine is to 
reduce health risk for the world’s majority, the great challenge will be to reduce costs of 
innovation and production of relevant therapeutics and make them widely available. 
There has been extensive and often spirited discussion on the pricing side of this issue, 
particularly in controversies about IPR and monopolistic practices (CIPR 2002). While 
pricing and access are important issues, they often neglect the more fundamental issue 
of underlying costs. Obviously, it is expensive to develop modern medications, and it 
makes little sense to simply advocate price cutting if one is talking about sustainable 
R&D to solve the health problems of future generations.  
The best solution to the twin challenges of profitable R&D and affordable medicine is 
economies of scale, and here we see enormous promise for biomedicine at the global 
scale. The key to achieving affordable medicines is to integrate supply chains across the 
three tiers of countries defined earlier. Tier I countries are the principal innovators and 
rights holders, but their production costs are high and their markets limited to about 20 
                                                 
6  There is some controversy about application of this technology, particularly in animal feeds, 
undermining the same commons.  
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per cent of global population. Tier II countries (e.g. China, India, and Brazil) have lower 
production costs in any case, but they also sharply increase scale economies by adding 
another 50 per cent of global population to retail market size. Finally, a second round of 
scale increases can be realized by marketing second tier production to Tier III countries.  
Of course the precedent for this has already been established in the generic drugs 
industry, where India’s leadership gives clear indications about how IPR reform might 
increase market size to reconcile profitability and affordability objectives. To achieve 
this will require more than spontaneous entrepreneurship, however, and we are currently 
undertaking detailed research on IPR mechanisms and policies to facilitate north-south 
technology transfer with these objectives in mind. 
4  Factors affecting adoption and effectiveness of biotechnology; 
examples from agriculture 
The term biotechnology refers to a wide array of approaches to applying recent 
developments in molecular and cell biology to commercial products. Thus far, 
biotechnology has very successful medical applications including a large number of 
therapeutics. It also has successful applications in agriculture, primarily for pest control 
thus far, but promises a wide range of other applications. Biotechnology has the 
potential to produce new biomaterials and address environmental problems. One of the 
key features of biotechnology is that its development and applications are outcomes of a 
division of innovative labour within the educational-industrial complex (Graff, Heiman, 
and Zilberman 2002). Many of the basic innovations were discovered by university 
scientists and have been patented and transferred to the private sector for development, 
regulatory, and commercialization via technology transfer agreements. Thus, the main 
industrial centres of biotechnology are linked and sometimes located quite near to 
research institutions. Frequently, university innovations are commercialized by startup 
companies that either evolve to become multinationals, as in the case of Genentech and 
Chiron, or are bought by major corporations: for example, Monsanto absorbed Calgene 
and adopted its technologies. The knowledge intensity of biotechnology makes 
management and control of intellectual property a key feature of industrial strategy 
within both universities and firms specializing in these technologies.  
Most of the biotechnology industry is concentrated in developed countries and aims to 
develop applications that tap demands and problems of the developed world where the 
ability to pay resides. Therefore, medical biotechnology aims to find cures for cancer, 
diabetes, and heart problems while downplaying investment in development of 
immunization systems towards diseases afflicting the poor. Agricultural biotechnology 
has introduced solutions to crops of the north, like cotton, canola, soybeans, and corn 
and underemphasizes development of varieties important only in the south, such as 
cassava and millet. However, the same technology, for example Bt and resistance to 
RoundUp, can be applied to the crop varieties of the poor in developing countries. Other 
technologies that may not have a viable market in the north, such as vitamin A or iron 
supplementation of crops, can also be applied in developing countries where 
micronutrient deficiencies are a serious public health concern. The key challenge is to 
obtain the resources and develop research and outreach infrastructure for applications 
that are relevant to poor and developing countries. Biotechnology is not unique in this  
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regard. In many cases, technologies that were developed in the north have been adapted, 
refined for the south.  
Much of the potential of biotechnology—and the controversy about its use—relate to 
agricultural applications. Therefore, we will address some of the concerns about 
genetically modified varieties (GMV) below, and, in particular, pest damage reducing 
GMVs, that are the most popular forms of agricultural biotechnology employed today. 
Much of the results will apply to other biotechnologies as well. 
An important feature of agricultural biotechnology is that new varieties are obtained by 
slight modification of existing varieties, while, with traditional breeding, new varieties 
may be substantially different than traditional varieties. Therefore, it is possible, in 
principal, to modify each existing variety, and the adoption of biotechnology can lead to 
preservation of the existing crop biodiversity in modified form. This insight has received 
too little attention in the popular debate on links between biotechnology and the 
environment. The extent to which it will happen depends on the economics and 
regulation of biotechnology. An analysis by Ameden, Qaim, and Zilberman (2005) 
considered the case where a producer with a traditional variety has to make the choice 
whether to adopt a modified pest-controlling variety.  
Consider an individual farmer with a local variety L whose yield is YL, where 
P L Y D Y ) 1 ( − =  
and YP denotes potential yield and D is an index of pest damage between zero and unity. 
If the farmer can use pesticides X to limit damage and faces prices pL for sale of output 
and pX for purchase of pesticide, then his profit from growing and spraying the local 
variety takes the form 
X p Y D p
X p Y p
x P L





If, on the other hand, the same farmer were to adopt a pest resistant GMV, profits would 
take the form  
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where profits and output prices are analogous and S denotes GMV seeds. Finally, we 
assume seeds are a fixed proportion of yield (s = SG/YG, i.e., the isoprofit boundary is 
linear). 
In the static case, we assume farmers are fully informed and risk neutral, so the adoption 
decision partitions the space of varietal yields as in Figure 1.  
The vertical intercept is pesticide cost per unit of average revenue. The slope of the 
adoption partition is the ratio of marginal GMV profitability to marginal revenue on 
gross (before pest damage) output of the local variety. Clearly, pest resistance confers a 
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have lower gross yields than localized varieties, so the slope and intercept of the 
adoption partition become empirically relevant. Even if we assume risk neutrality and 
equal prices for both varieties, pesticide efficacy (D) and the cost of the GMV (pS) will 
be essential determinants of the adoption decision. 
Adoption of a GMV will reduce pest damage and pesticides application. The impact of 
GMV adoption is a random variable because of the randomness of pest damage, and the 
yield gain from adoption is likely to be higher in periods of high infestation. If the GMV 
is based on a generic variety, adoption may actually lead to lower yield in periods of 
low infestation. If farmers are risk-averse, they will adopt the GMV if expected utility 
of GMV income exceeds that of the traditional variety. In making the adoption decision, 
the gains associated with the change in the yield distribution and reduction in pesticides 
costs are compared to the extra cost of the GMV seeds. The likelihood of GMV 
adoption can be expected to increase as (i) the price of the GMV declines, (ii) the pest 
pressure increases, (iii) the effectiveness of traditional pesticides declines, (iv) and the 
price of pesticides rises.  
The analysis suggests that adoption of GMV is likely to have a significant effect on 
average yields in locations with high levels of pest infestation and lack of effective 
chemical pest control (either because of cost or availability). In other locations, where 
pesticides are used effectively, the GMV adoption may not have as great a yield effect 
but can reduce pesticide use and its attendant externalities. Indeed, In the US and China 
the adoption of Bt cotton increased average yields by less than 10 per cent, but 
substantially reduced pesticides use, and in the case of China it had measurable health 
benefits through decreased instances of farm worker poisoning. The yield effects of Bt 
cotton adoption in India have fluctuated between 25-80 per cent. The yield effects in 
south Africa and Mexico have been quite high as well.  
The studies in India cited in Ameden, Qaim, and Zilberman also emphasize the greater 
gain from adoption when the modified variety is well adjusted to local conditions,  
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compared to cases of generic GMV adoption. The extent of GMV adoption by 
heterogeneous farmers suggests that, holding everything else constant, more adoption is 
likely to occur if the new variety is a genetic modification of a local variety rather than 
of a generic variety. These results suggest that if local varieties are modified, both the 
adoption effect and yield effect are higher than if the GMV is a generic variety. 
Furthermore, the larger supply shifts that are likely to occur with modified local 
varieties may lead to a lower reduction in output price, and thus, greater improvement in 
the welfare of consumers, including the poor, relative to the case where the GMV is a 
generic variety. 
The decision whether to import generic varieties or modify local varieties is an 
economic one, made by the firm or government agency that distributes or sells the 
GMVs. This in turn will depend upon the cost of national or local adaptations of the 
GMV (via backcrossing7 or other means), compared to the net gains vis-à-vis the 
generic variety and the traditional ones. The extra cost of modifying local varieties 
depends on national/local technical and regulatory infrastructure. In most Tier I 
countries, as well as Tier II countries that strong crop breeding sector (India, China and 
Brazil), it will not be difficult or very costly to modify a large number of traditional 
varieties of crops like corn or soybeans through backcrossing from the initial 
‘transforming event’ (new transgenic trait to be inserted) which is created by 
transferring the genetic sequence with genetic coding for a desirable trait to a particular 
receptor variety. In less advanced developing countries in Asia. Latin America and 
Africa, infrastructure constraints will restrict the capacity to modify local variety and 
may lead to significant introduction of imported GMVs, which will negatively affect 
biodiversity, and the impacts of biotechnology on outputs and prices.  
The modification of local varieties is likely to suffer when regulatory cost and efforts 
are required for each modified variety, and are not confined to the transformation event. 
The regulatory cost at the variety level slows adoption of Bt cotton in India and 
substantially reduces the attendant yield gains, since in some locations Bt is introduced 
with varieties that are not very effective to the local conditions. By contrast, the US and 
China do not require registration for every modified variety (they apply only at the level 
of the genetic transformation event) and this probably contributes to the much larger 
number of Bt cotton varieties in these countries relative to India. 
Finally, Ameden, Qaim, and Zilberman argue that the extent of adoption and the gains 
from adoption of GMVs depend on the price of the modified varieties. Adoption and 
gains will decline as the distributor of the new varieties takes advantage of monopoly 
power. The number of modified varieties available may be restricted because of barriers 
to cooperation and trade between the entities that control the traditional varieties and the 
owners or distributors of the rights to the genetic modification. While this analysis and 
the wider literature address mostly pest control biotechnology, the general conclusions 
are likely to apply to other categories of technology such as stress resistance or 
nutritional quality. The same rational that favours adoption of a genetic modification of 
the local variety over a generic GMV with the new genetic trait, applies to other traits as 
well. Therefore we can conclude that the gains from introduction of GMVs in 
developing countries will be enhanced (i) when it is associated with the availability of 
                                                 
7  Backcrossing is a breeding technique that mates a new variety to local variety over successive 
generations.  
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crop breeding capacity that will allow modification of existing varieties, (ii) when 
registration requirements are at the transformation event level and not the variety level 
(i.e., do not require separate registration for downstream backcrossed varieties), (iii) 
when there are low transaction costs and barriers to trade between owners of the new 
biotechnology and the local varieties and (iv) as the cost of the modified variety 
declines.  
5  An agenda for more effective north-south biotechnology diffusion 
Until now, biotechnological innovation and product development has been confined 
largely to research systems in OECD countries, yet the economic and social potential of 
these technologies is global in scope. In agriculture, for example, Bt cotton has been 
widely adopted in the United States and conferred significant gains there in terms of 
reduced pesticide dependence and lower consumer costs. Recent studies of India (Qaim 
and Zilberman 2003) show even more dramatic per hectare gains, and research in China 
(Pray et al. 2002) associates its adoption with improved worker health and reduced 
environmental side effects. More generally, higher pest intensity in developing countries 
and more limited alternatives for pest control further amplify the relative benefits of pest 
mitigating biotechnologies, including collateral gains in terms of reduced chemical 
loading of soil, water, and other resources.  
Despite this emergent evidence, the world remains sharply divided when it comes to 
biotechnological research, innovation, and assimilation. Instinctive resistance to radical 
innovations might seem prosaic for everyday consumer technologies, but it has graver 
implications in the context of human nutrition and health. In the developing world, 
especially in some of the poorest countries, there has been precious little basic or 
applied research of the kind we are discussing, either of the public or private sector 
variety. Even in China and India, which have strong scientific traditions and many 
public and private laboratories, the trends we delineated in the previous two sections are 
only beginning to be established.  
Application of biotechnology generally, and especially in developing countries, requires 
more intensive public sector investment in research, development, and commercial 
licensing because such investment may be desirable from a social perspective, given the 
distribution of benefits to consumers and users of the technology, but may not be 
profitable from a private perspective. Fortunately, national and international research 
centres and public and private aid agencies are funding or considering investment to 
enhance biotechnology research and development capacity in developing countries. In 
this case, lack of access to intellectual property is one of the primary obstacles. One way 
to overcome this is establishment of an intellectual property rights (IPR) clearinghouse 
(Graff and Zilberman 2001), a model of institution that can serve several purposes.8  
To understand some of the potential benefits of the IPR clearinghouse, it is important to 
compare the way intellectual property management differs between the private and 
                                                 
8  This idea extends the R&D facilitation arguments of Castillo, Parker, and Zilberman (1998); Wright 
(1998) also emphasizes the importance of facilitating institutions for dispersion of public research 
benefits in biotech.  
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public sectors. The private sector recognizes IPR constraints as part of the cost of doing 
business. New projects are not introduced without ‘freedom to operate’, i.e., access to 
all intellectual property needed for development and commercialization (whether 
through ownership or licensing agreements). 
In the course of pursuing their own research agendas, public sector scientists generally 
lack this freedom. In particular, they lack information on ownership of technologies, 
means of accessing permission to use those technologies, or both. While usually 
immaterial to their progress in basic (i.e., non-commercial) research, this limitation can 
seriously undermine the potential for any future commercialization of resulting 
innovations. The objectives of the intellectual property clearinghouse organization are to 
provide researchers with information and access, to overcome the constraints and reduce 
the transaction costs associated with intellectual property. 
Private sector organizations use their own IPR holdings to secure access to other needed 
components of intellectual property. One reason for cross licensing, strategic alliances, 
and merger arrangements between firms is to enlarge and diversify their IPR portfolios, 
thereby increasing their flexibility in research, development, and commercialization 
(Graff, Rausser, and Small 2003). Private ownership of patents by corporations is 
perceived to be a major constraint of technology use in developing countries and for 
orphan crops. However, in some cases, obtaining the access to patents that are owned by 
universities may be as difficult or even more difficult (Graff and Zilberman 2001). 
Some researchers in developing countries actually maintain that they have a harder time 
obtaining rights to utilize technologies from public offices of technology transfer than 
from private companies. Companies provide technologies to orphan markets simply for 
the sake of public relation gains. Such goodwill motives may induce them give away the 
rights to use the technology, especially in developing products that do not threaten 
established markets or other financial interests. For some university inventors, the 
income from use of technology is of major importance, and they may be reluctant to 
waive away their rights to the revenues generated by their technology. One possible role 
of the clearinghouse is thus to establish arrangements for facilitating access to public 
sector and especially university patents for orphan markets.  
Greater transparency can also facilitate clear delineation of market scope, reducing risks 
of spillovers to competing interests. In this sense, some barriers to technologies that 
originate in the public sector may be the result of imprecise marketing. Companies may 
obtain the rights of a patent for all markets, while in reality they may be interested in 
applying the patent to a small number of crops in OECD countries. Once they own the 
rights, liability considerations, transaction costs, and other factors may limit the capacity 
of researchers to utilize technologies for orphan markets. One possible role of the 
clearinghouse is to share knowledge and research cost to develop precise technology 
transfer procedures that will lead to more efficient and socially beneficial IPR 
management. The above analysis suggests several objectives for an IPR clearinghouse 
for agricultural biotechnology: 
•  Reduce transaction costs for the commercialization of innovations (Shapiro 
2000); 
•  Expand the universe of accessible technologies accessible (for research and 
product development);   
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•  Improve efficiency of technology transfer mechanisms and practices in public 
sector institutions; 
•  Increase transparency of IPR ownership; 
•  Provide mechanisms to expedite IPR negotiation and access; 
•  Consolidate the public interest in technology origination and development. 
There have been several recent attempts to develop IPR clearinghouses in 
biotechnology. The Rockefeller and McKnight Foundations are collaborating with 24 
major universities and plant science research institutes in the United States to establish 
the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA). This initiative aims 
to increase public sector scientists’ freedom to operate and provide access to IPR to 
develop technologies for orphan crops. The new organization of PIPRA will have two 
core elements: (i) a database of member institutions’ IPR ownership in agricultural 
biotechnology and the availability of those technologies, particularly for ‘orphan’ crop 
applications, and (ii) licensing mechanisms, such as patent pools, to make aggregated 
technology systems available ex ante while reducing transaction costs and uncertainties. 
PIPRA consists of over two dozen member institutions that will share information on 
their technologies with each other and with technology users, i.e., researchers in 
developing countries. Namely, the member universities basically combine information 
on all technologies that they control into a database, with licensing status information 
available to one another and to subscribing PIPRA clients, and with basic information 
available to the public. Then, the technologies can be analysed, sorted, and arranged 
according to their functions, to ease freedom-to-operate access within the IPR maze to 
particular enabling technologies and genetic applications. PIPRA will aim to provide a 
set of technologies that will allow pursuit of a broad range of agricultural biotechnology 
applications.  
Public sector institutions account for a very significant share of the intellectual assets in 
agricultural biotechnology, suggesting this strategy of coordinating access just to 
public-sector owned technologies (Graff et al. 2003). By 2000, 24 per cent of US 
agricultural biotechnology patents were owned by public sector entities, concentrated in 
research universities in the United States and in the OECD countries, while 41 per cent 
were owned by the ‘Big 5’ (Monsanto, 14 per cent; DuPont, 13 per cent; Syngenta, 7 
per cent; Bayer, 4 per cent; and Dow, 3 per cent). The rest of the private sector, mostly 
start-ups and smaller companies, owned 33 per cent of agricultural biotechnology 
patents. Similar proportions are observed in other OECD patent systems (including the 
EU, Japan, and Patent Cooperation Treaty applications). Using cluster analysis of the 
full patent dataset, Graff et al. (2003) documented that public sector organizations have 
in fact patented broadly across the various technology classes necessary for most 
applications of agricultural biotechnology.9 In addition, the range of research projects 
that could be supported by public sector owned IPR is also significantly enhanced by a 
wide range of unpatented or off-patent innovations that are accumulating in the public 
domain.  
                                                 
9  The sheer complexity of this system, and some if the efficiency implications, is explained by Shapiro 
(2000).  
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Yet, while the public sector has significant IPR ownership, it is diffused among many 
institutions. No individual public institution has more than 2 per cent of total patents. 
The diffused ownership of IPRs by public sector institutions means that the transaction 
costs involved in putting together technologies from the public sector are not 
insignificant. The role of a PIPRA as an IPR clearinghouse would be to coordinate 
information on and access to the public sector’s technologies.  
In addition, the rights to public sector technologies have in some cases10 already been 
transferred to the private sector through exclusive licensing agreements. It is essential to 
know the actual scope of technologies still controlled by the public sector, i.e., not 
subject to contracts that have transferred exclusive control to commercial partners. 
Information on the licensing of technologies is often confidential and thus not available. 
This lack of transparency increases risk and transactions cost for potential entrants in 
research and product development, hindering innovation and the realization of its 
benefits. A fundamental role of PIPRA is to collect updated information about 
technology ownership and licensing status and to advise users on where to obtain 
technologies they need. Additionally, PIPRA’s team can advise researchers, 
administrators, and managers about practical intellectual property management 
strategies.  
Another clearinghouse is the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF). 
Also supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, it aims to facilitate research and 
introduction of new sophisticated crop varieties (including biotechnology) in sub-
Saharan Africa. It emphasizes technology transfer from the private sector and will help 
scientists to overcome IPR and regulatory requirements. AATF aims to coordinate with 
participating companies in the private sector directly to obtain licenses for use of their 
technologies in Africa for humanitarian causes. This organization will go beyond 
technology transfer, providing some funding for research, biosafety management, and 
development. Its main emphasis, however, is to work with technology owners and 
project partners including donors to negotiate overall licenses. The AATF will be the 
licensee, and then sublicense the technologies to research teams and developers. 
In the medical arena, a clearinghouse institution is MIHR (Management of Intellectual 
Property in Health). Its motivation is to facilitate access to IPRs for developing 
therapies to diseases (tuberculosis, AIDS, malaria) afflicting the poor. Its main areas of 
work include: (i) identification and codification of best practices for licensing to achieve 
the goals of the public sector; (ii) provision of training to scientists, universities, and 
research institutes in managing intellectual property to benefit the public sector in both 
developed and developing countries; and (iii) consulting services to developed and 
developing county groups concerned with research and product development. 
Private ownership of technology will remain a controversial subject for the foreseeable 
future, since it embodies both the promise of sustained innovation and the consequences 
of monopolization. The responsibility of public entities is clearly strike a balance 
between facilitating the former and mitigating the latter, and effective policies toward 
biotechnology must reflect this. Facilitating access to IPR, while maintaining the ability 
                                                 
10 About 20-30 per cent of universities’ agricultural life science patents have, depending upon the field 
of technology, been licensed according to recent data from PIPRA.  
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to use IPR to incentivize further development, is the primary impetus for the initiatives 
discussed above, but other considerations are also important. 
6  Clear patent delineation  
Designing optimal patents and licensing contracts is a challenge (Gilbert and Shapiro 
1990; Klemperer 1990; Anand and Khanna 2000; Burk and Lemley 2003). If patents are 
too broad, they may hamper future research and undermine access to the commons of 
intellectual and scientific discovery. If they are too narrow, they will undermine 
incentives for private discovery and incentives for following up discovery with 
development and commercialization. This latter incentive effect may be even more 
important because it applies to both private and public discovery. Research to develop 
methodologies for precise patenting and licensing contracts and their implementation 
are of paramount importance. 
Currently, genomic knowledge is patentable to varying degrees around the world, and 
the discovery of a gene sequence and its use can confer some degree of market power. 
However, it is argued that genomic discoveries are not in fact novel and, therefore, do 
not justify patenting in most cases. Companies deciphering genetic codes, such as 
Celera, famous for its role in sequencing the human genome, now earn their primary 
income via information services (i.e., selling access to their databases). On the other 
hand, functional genomic discoveries, those that identify the function of genes and their 
potential applications, are more logical candidates for patenting. The evolving legal 
distinctions between genomic and functional genomic innovations illustrate the 
importance of adjusting patent criteria as the state of knowledge advances.  
7  Biodiversity and biotechnology: A two-way street  
The relationship between biotechnology and biodiversity is a contentious one, and is 
generally not well understood. On the one hand, there is a public perception that 
biotechnology reduces biodiversity. On the other, there is a widely held sentiment that 
agricultural technology institutions (public and private) seek to appropriate biodiversity 
resources from developing countries. 
On the first point, biotechnology actually has the potential to enhance biodiversity. 
Bt-insect resistance technology, for example, enables local varieties to be made pest 
resistant, obviating the need to adopt and adapt more homogeneous ‘global’ varieties as 
was the norm during the Green Revolution. As a result, the US now has more than 1000 
varieties of RoundUp Ready soybean, most of which are single-gene variants of local 
legacy varieties (Qaim, Yarkin, and Zilberman 2003). Far from homogenizing the gene 
pool, the introduction of agricultural biotechnology in OECD markets has acted to 
protect and even increase biodiversity (Sneller 2003).  
The issue of biodiversity prospecting and (implicitly) north-south property rights might 
seem more ambiguous. Genetic material from the developing world has certainly 
contributed to science and practical technology in OECD economies, but the 
productivity gains of technology transfer in the opposite direction have been enormous.  
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There is a growing literature on the economics of biodiversity that shows for most 
locations, the potential value of biodiversity it is very low (Simpson, Sedjo, and Reid 
1996). The economic value of a species is more likely to be discovered and developed if 
concentrated in one of a small number of ‘hot spots’ (Rausser and Small 2000), Thus, 
the scope of compensation for biodiversity is limited and should not be foreseen as a 
major source of income for developing countries (Dalton 2004; Simpson and Sedjo 
2004). 
Like the green revolution, public and private agency will accomplish their primary 
objective (public welfare and profit, respectively) only if they achieve their secondary 
mission, increasing agricultural productivity and food security in the developing world. 
From an economist’s perspective, land is an immobile factor of production, and for this 
reason globalization of agricultural biotechnology cannot succeed without local 
assimilation. Some observers see the advent of agricultural biotechnology as a process 
of global consolidation, but emerging evidence on the Bt trait reveals the opposite, a 
process of technology dispersal and localization. Instead of adapting innumerable 
farmers to a few varieties, agricultural biotechnology appears to be adapting a few 
technologies to innumerable local varieties. This suggests not the imposition of agro-
industrial market power on a global scale, but a partnership to overcome barriers to 
increased production for the world’s majority enterprise, small farming, building upon 
the global legacy of biodiversity.  
Having said this, the evolution and eventual success of such a partnership will depend 
critically on innovation and technology sharing, where the latter encompasses both man-
made and natural technology (e.g. biodiversity). This in turn will depend upon clear 
delineation, ownership, and market articulation of property rights, and much remains to 
be done in these areas. The IPRC can perform an essential service here, by increasing 
transparency and reducing transactions costs, but public institutions will have to fill 
many gaps in global standards for more complete markets to develop in this area. 
8  Education: A north-south partnership in human capital development 
Biotechnology is in its infancy. The tools of molecular biology promise a future where 
biological solutions for many industrial problems will become more efficient and 
environmentally friendly than the conventional (in most cases chemical) main stream 
alternative. While most of the technology has been developed in the north, most of the 
world’s genetic resources are in the south. At the present, much of the research is aimed 
at developing tools to utilize genetic materials, but many of the biggest opportunities in 
the future will arise from better understanding of functional genomics. Much of this 
research can, and in fact will need to be facilitated by north-south partnerships. It will be 
important for the south to participate more fully in such partnerships, and on more 
equitable footing. Better capacity to take advantage of their own biodiversity will allow 
the south to take a better bargaining position to negotiate its role in R&D partnerships.  
Biotechnology has, to a large extent, originated and been sustained by public sector 
research, and many of the entrepreneurial centres of this industry have been built in 
proximity of universities. It has thereby become apparent that, to succeed in 
biotechnology, a country needs to develop and maintain superior higher education, 
developing the educational-industrial complex to generate simultaneously the necessary  
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human capital and the potentially marketable intellectual property. This observation 
alone defines an agenda for education-oriented development assistance, whether it be 
private or public, bilateral or multilateral.11 Perhaps the greatest challenge, but 
ultimately the greatest opportunity, for fuller north-south partnership in biotechnology 
innovation is education.  
Technology development generally, and biotechnology development in particular, are 
strong complements for human capital development, and conversely research and 
development are especially human-capital intensive. The geographic and institutional 
symbiosis between modern universities and the technology clusters of particular sectors 
is an important example of this. Yet, it is an example that developing countries have 
difficulty emulating for many reasons. A combination of underinvestment in education, 
insufficiency of private capital, and, in many cases, access only to small size markets 
has prevented the emergence of significant research capacity in most developing 
countries. Even in those with large and long established scientific traditions, like China 
and India, are in the earliest stages of building and integrating the sophisticated public-
private research relations that are hallmarks of dynamic technology sectors in OECD 
countries. 
These facts reveal the need for expanded international partnership, both public and 
private, to develop capacity for biotechnology innovation and commercialization in the 
south. On the public side, aid agencies should reaffirm their commitments to human 
capital development generally, and scientific capacity in particular, recognizing this as 
the key to sustained productivity growth and higher living standards. Private interests, 
for their part, should take new initiatives to leverage human resources in developing 
countries, transferring technology and capital into new markets and thereby gaining 
first-mover advantage in these emerging biotechnology markets. China, India, and other 
large, populous developing ‘Tier II’ countries are already attractive candidates for this 
kind of entrepreneurship, while smaller, less advanced ‘Tier II’ countries should be seen 
in a regionalized perspective. 
9  Technology and poverty 
Technology effects on poverty can be direct or indirect. A technological innovation can 
help reduce poverty directly by raising the welfare of the poor who adopt a new 
technology themselves or benefit from productivity enhancement in their work. Benefits 
for households who adopt new technology in their own production activities derive from 
increased production for home consumption, more nutritious foods, higher gross 
revenues derived both from higher sales volumes and higher unit value products, lower 
production costs, lower yield risks, lowered individual and soil productivity, exposure to 
toxic chemicals, and improved natural resource management. For poor workers, 
adoption of new technology by their employers can raise their productivity, enhance 
human capital, improve safety, and make work less onerous. Other direct benefits from 
technology may include improved health status from better health care, improved 
                                                 
11 Development assistance to overcome the north-south technology gap is simply an example of the old 
‘giving a fish versus teaching to fish’ adage, but with more profound growth implications because of 
endogenous growth externalities.  
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sanitation, and reductions in other public health risks. All these contribute directly to 
worker productivity, earning potential, and quality of life. 
Technological change can help reduce poverty indirectly through growth and efficiency 
effects. Technology adoption in agriculture can increase yields and lower food costs for 
the urban poor. Technology or productivity induced economic growth elsewhere in the 
economy will spill over to rural markets via accelerating food and labour demand. 
Through these production, expenditure, and savings linkages, the agricultural sector will 
rise with the rest of the economy. Finally, if innovation improves international 
competitiveness, agriculture will enjoy foreign exchange benefits through expanding 
exports. 
Through the price of food, indirect effects can benefit a broader spectrum of the national 
poor, including landless farm workers, net food buying smallholders, nonagricultural 
rural poor, and the urban poor for whom food represents a large share of total 
expenditures. Indirect effects via employment creation are important for landless farm 
workers, net labour supplying smallholders, and the rural nonagricultural and urban 
poor. Hence, the indirect effects of technological change can be very important for 
poverty reduction not only among urban households, but also in the rural sector among 
the landless and many of the landed poor who buy food and sell labour. 
When are there trade-offs in technology between achieving direct and indirect effects? 
Within a given agro-ecological region, if land is unequally distributed and if there are 
market failures, institutional gaps, and conditions of access to public goods that vary 
with farm size, then optimum farming systems vary accordingly. Small farmers 
typically prefer farming systems that offer greater value-added per unit of land, are 
capital-saving, and less risky, while large farmers prefer farming systems that are 
labour-saving, and they can afford to assume more risk if they are compensated by 
higher expected incomes. In this case, there will exist trade-offs between achieving 
indirect and direct effects if budget constraints in research requires priority setting, i.e., 
if technology is designed for one system but not another. The more unequally land is 
distributed and the more market, institutional, and government failures are farm-size 
specific, the sharper the trade-off will be. 
The relative magnitude of the direct and indirect effects of technological change in 
agriculture on poverty can be quantified through computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models.12 In these models, the direct effects include the change in agricultural profit for 
adopting farmers, the changing opportunity cost of home consumption for own 
production, and the change in self-employment on one’s own farm. The indirect income 
effect comes from changes in nominal income from all sources other than own 
agricultural production. The indirect price effect comes from the change in prices, 
excluding the effect through the opportunity cost of home consumption. 
In more detailed analysis (Graff, Roland-Holst, and Zilberman 2005), we conclude that, 
if there are trade-offs between creating direct and indirect effects due to constraints on 
research budgets, care must be taken to allocate budgets optimally between these 
                                                 
12 These models have become the preferred tool for empirical policy analysis, and are especially well 
suited to quantifying the complex indirect effects of pervasive innovations such as biotechnology. For 
general background and applications of this methodology, see e.g., Lee and Roland-Holst (1998).  
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technological options to maximize poverty reduction. While surprisingly little formal 
analysis has been made of these trade-offs, optimal allocation needs to be determined 
for each nation and region for which research programmes are organized. 
10  Technology and rural development 
Biotechnology may offer a significant potential for poverty reduction in smallholder 
agriculture. There are however, four caveats to be considered. One is that potentially 
cheaper and faster sources of income gains than agricultural technology may not have 
been exhausted, particularly through greater access to land, improved property rights, 
investments in irrigation, higher levels of human capital, and access to non-agricultural 
sources of employment. 
The second is that technological advances other than biotechnology may be more 
appropriate for enhancing smallholder incomes. This is the case for many products of 
traditional approaches to research that have never been targeted at smallholders. This 
includes improved farming systems, agro-ecological farming practices, and traditional 
breeding for the specific, and often highly particular, contexts where they are located. 
These approaches will often not be substitutes but complements to biotechnology. 
The third is that, for any kind of technology to be adopted by smallholders, many 
market failures that affect the smallholders need to be eliminated, institutional gaps 
removed, complementary public goods provided, and policies that do not discriminate 
against the agricultural sector or poor farmers put into place. This includes in particular 
access to credit and to risk management tools such as mutual insurance and safety nets, 
and low transactions costs in factor and product markets. Unless these conditions are in 
place, adoption will not happen. 
Finally, for technology adoption to result in maximum poverty reduction, the other 
dimensions of welfare also need to be accessible. This includes in particular the 
components of basic human needs (health, education) and the more qualitative 
dimensions of welfare such as empowerment and rights. 
Hence, to be effectively used for poverty reduction, technology instruments need to be 
embedded within a comprehensive rural development and poverty reduction strategy for 
the region concerned that weighs technology alongside other instruments for income 
gains, carefully discriminates among alternative technological paths, makes the 
technological innovation accessible to the poor for whom it was intended, and 
complements income gains with access to the other dimensions of welfare. 
11  Conclusions and extensions 
Throughout human history, technology has proven its ability to contribute to higher 
material living standards, yet the work of poverty alleviation is far from complete. We 
believe that in the modern age, biotechnology holds remarkable potential for reducing 
poverty and its attendant adversities. However, the extent to which this promise is 
fulfilled will depend as much on institutions as it does on innovation. History is also  
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replete with examples of technologies that have contributed to immiseration because of 
inadvertent or even deliberate agency that misapplied them. 
In these early stages of development, biotechnology is concentrated in the most 
developed, Tier I countries. In this paper, we envision future biotechnology diffusion 
around the world, with large emergent Tier II economies playing a catalytic role in 
propagating affordable and appropriate innovation products. Through the mechanism of 
a globally distributed and articulated R&D supply chain, such products can ultimately 
reach the world’s poorest and improve their dietary, health, and income status. 
Agricultural biotechnology can directly and indirectly raise incomes for the world’s 
rural poor majorities, while medical biotechnology can improve health status and 
capacity for gainful employment. To realize this, public and private agency must be 
reconciled into global R&D partnerships that satisfy three necessary conditions: 
i)  Local capacity for technology adaptation 
ii)  Least-cost, responsible regulation 
iii)  Unrestricted informational access. 
In a survey paper like this, we can only sketch the institutional reforms needed to 
accomplish global biotechnology diffusion, but a few salient features deserve emphasis. 
First, property rights must be clearly delineated and recognized by more universal 
standards. Second, multilateral public and private initiative must be taken to lower 
barriers to diffusion. These include government intervention, imperfect contractual 
standards, and incomplete information. A broad spectrum of government policies—
from outright protectionism to corruption—impedes the propagation of innovation 
between countries of all three Tiers. Incompatibility and incompleteness of legal 
systems are also major obstacles to international sharing of innovation. Finally, 
informational commons supported by institutions like the IPR clearinghouse are needed 
to facilitate innovation partnership.  
Those who seek to expand technology’s contributions, including the present authors, 
need to more completely delineate the institutional reforms that can facilitate truly 
global innovation processes. Here we gave a general vision of R&D networks extending 
from the capital and technology rich Tier I, through the dynamic Tier II emerging 
economies, to those, finally, in Tier III who most need enhanced agricultural and human 
productivity. We believe that achieving this goal is not only desirable, but imperative to 
global sustainable development. 
If the poor are to enjoy the full benefits of agricultural biotechnology, its productivity 
gains must be conferred on both rural and urban low income households. The former 
will benefit directly if biotechnology is appropriate (both in terms of technology and 
incentives) for penetration into smallholder production systems. By contrast, the latter 
benefit must be indirect, with lower food prices contributing favourably to real wages of 
the urban poor. Only dramatic increases in productivity can thus reconcile producer and 
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